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1 Introduction
The literature on trade agreements (TAs) overwhelmingly focuses on the formation of free
trade areas (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) - the two types of TAs most commonly
observed in practice. In this paper, we focus on a number of fundamental, indeed, existential,
questions about TAs and their role in world trade that have received minimal attention. In
particular, we call into question the widely held assumption that, in practice, FTAs are
overwhelmingly preferred to CUs.
Since Viner’s (1950) seminal work, the defining characteristics of FTAs and CUs have
remained largely unchallenged and, so far, immutable.1 Both FTAs and CUs involve pref-
erential trade between members. However, while FTA members are free to levy diﬀerent
external tariﬀs on excluded countries, CU members must choose a common external tariﬀ
(CET). Consequently, a FTA requires rules of origin to support the diﬀerent external tariﬀ
rates levied by members.2 Members of a CU, on the other hand, must agree on a system
of income transfers to share the CET revenue raised. This paper argues that the standard
definition of CUs used in the literature is problematic. Not only can it give a misleading
impression of the behavior of CU members, it also fails to capture the true nature of the
choice prospective members face between joining a FTA or a CU.
We first ask: from the point of view of CU members, what constitutes an optimal CU?
Allowing for lump sum transfers between members, we demonstrate that when (asymmetric)
CU members choose jointly optimal but diﬀerent external tariﬀ rates, they are better oﬀ
than if they are compelled to levy a CET. In what follows, we refer to this alternative
CU design as the Generalized CU (GCU); any CU characterized by a CET is labeled a
Standard CU (SCU).3 If members are symmetric, then the Generalized and Standard CUs
converge. However, even the slightest degree of member asymmetry renders a SCU sub-
1See Freund and Ornelas (2010) for a comprehensive and state-of-the-art review of the literature on TAs.
2Rules of origin determine the duty-free status of goods that originate in non-member nations but are
traded within the TA. Without such rules, all imports would enter the TA area via the member with the
lowest external tariﬀ rate, before being on-sold duty free to their final destination. In this case, the TA
would eﬀectively become a CU with the lowest external tariﬀ the eﬀective CET.
3The assumption that CU members levy a CET on excluded countries is all-pervasive in the literature.
See, for example, Kemp and Wan (1976), Riezman (1985), Bagwell and Staiger (1997), Syropoulos (2002,
2003), Ornelas (2007) and Facchini et al. (2012).
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optimal.4 Incidentally, note that, just as in a FTA, but in contrast to a SCU, a GCU requires
rules of origin to support the diﬀerent external tariﬀ rates levied by member countries.
Since there exists an alternative CU design that is welfare-superior for members, why
are CETs observed in practice?5 One answer to this question is that the World Trade
Organization (WTO) requires it. Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and
Trade (GATT) stipulates that “each of the members of the union” must apply “substantially
the same duties and other regulations of commerce ... to the trade of territories not included
in the union.” In theory, as well as in practice, this clause has been interpreted as requiring
CU members to levy a CET.
But, this just begs a supplementary question; namely, why does the WTO impose the
CET restriction on CU members? We demonstrate that a GCU results in external tariﬀ
rates that are higher in trade-weighted terms than those levied by its Standard counterpart.
This yields a potential “smoking gun” that explains the codification of CET choice in the
WTO’s trade rule book. After all, Article XXIV of the GATT explicitly states that “the
purpose of a CU or of a FTA should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories
and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories.”
By obliging CU members to choose a CET, their monopoly power in trade policy can be
neutered somewhat.
Note that WTO rules do not preclude the formation of GCUs. Indeed, from the perspec-
tive of Article XXIV, a GCU and a FTA are indistinguishable from one another; in each case
members levy diﬀerent external tariﬀ rates on non-members, supporting these diﬀerential
rates with rules of origin. This insight raises an intriguing possibility: that many of the
FTAs actually observed in practice are, in fact, GCUs “in camouflage”.
Two further questions now arise. First, since GCUs are welfare superior (for members)
to SCUs, why do we observe the latter in practice? Second, if, as we claim, GCUs are less
trade-facilitating than their Standard counterparts, why are they not explicitly prohibited
by the WTO?
4In general, it is not even necessarily true that zero internal tariﬀs are optimal. We do not pursue this
issue further here.
5CETs form an important part of the architecture of the European Union and Mercosur among other
observed CUs.
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The simple answer to the first of these questions is that member countries will implement
a GCU if they can avoid sanction for violating the CET requirements ofArticle XXIV. On the
other hand, they will implement a SCU when the CET requirements of Article XXIV can be
legally enforced. For example, consider the following situation. Assume that member welfare
rankings over diﬀerent types of TAs are common knowledge; that is, all players, including
the WTO, can observe them. Though observable, however, say these welfare rankings are
not verifiable; that is, they cannot be proved in law. At the same time, whether or not
members are levying a CET is verifiable, although the tariﬀ rates themselves are not.6
If the combination of the observability of the members’ TA ranking and the verifiability
of the absence of a CET are together suﬃcient to satisfy the legal burden of proof then the
ranking of a SCU versus a FTA by prospective members becomes pivotal. In particular, if
members prefer a SCU to a FTA, then they will (have to) respect Article XXIV and levy
a CET. If they did not, the WTO (and, indeed, all players) would immediately infer that
a GCU has been implemented and legally sanction members on the basis of the observed
inconsistency between their preference for a SCU (among WTO-compliant TA types) and
the verifiable absence of a CET.7 If, on the other hand, members prefer a FTA to a SCU,
they will implement a GCU in defiance of Article XXIV. In this case, members are safe from
legal sanction since their observed preference for a FTA (among WTO-compliant TA types)
is consistent with the verifiable absence of a CET.
Of course, there are numerous alternative explanations for why prospective members
may choose not to implement a GCU in spite of its welfare dominance over other TA types.
For example, members may deem a GCU too costly for political reasons or on the basis
of excessive transactions costs associated with negotiations between prospective members.8
Since our main aim here is simply to demonstrate the potential for GCUs to exist (and be
mistaken for FTAs) we leave these important extensions for future work.
Regarding the second question, ideally the WTO would like to proscribe GCUs while at
6That is, whether or not the observed diﬀerent external tariﬀ rates actually correspond to the observed
TA cannot be verified.
7Remember that in our model GCUs welfare dominate all other TA types everywhere.
8Horn et al. (2010) develop a model of TAs in which contracting is costly and, as a result, the optimal
agreement is incomplete. Their specific focus is to explain the structure of tariﬀ bindings in the GATT/WTO.
They do not seek to apply their model to the formation of discriminatory TAs, nor do they seek to justify
the structure of Article XXIV of the GATT.
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the same time allowing FTAs to form. In practice, however, this is diﬃcult to achieve. As
just argued, even when the combination of observed member TA rankings and the verifiable
absence of a CET is suﬃcient to satisfy the legal burden of proof, the WTO still cannot
distinguish in a legally meaningful way between a GCU and a FTA. As a result, the WTO
would either have to prohibit both GCUs and FTAs or neither. We demonstrate, however,
that FTAs can yield significant benefits for world welfare and so proscribing both types of
TA would be inappropriate. Instead, the WTO satisfies itself with regulating a CU’s external
tariﬀs as an indirect way of regulating the process by which CU members choose to derive
them. Incidentally, note the irony in Article XXIV of the GATT. The fact that countries
are permitted to establish FTAs facilitates the camouflaging of GCUs and, in this way,
undermines the WTO’s ability to limit the monopoly power of prospective CU members.
This is despite the fact that FTAs confer less monopoly power on member countries than
either a GCU or a SCU.
The current paper contributes to the TA literature in a number of ways. First, and
most fundamentally, we show that current theoretical models of CUs, while consistent with
WTO rules, may not accurately reflect how external tariﬀs are chosen in observed TAs.
In particular, the standard theoretical treatment of CUs precludes the possibility that an
observed FTA may in fact be a GCU. This possibility has, to our knowledge, never been
entertained previously in the literature.
A second contribution of the paper is the implication that the apparent paradox between
the predicted primacy of CUs and the observed dominance of FTAs may, in fact, be less
acute than previously thought. The regionalism literature has recently begun to focus on
explaining why, contrary to the predictions of traditional theory, FTAs are overwhelmingly
preferred to CUs in practice.9 An important message from this paper is that, consistent with
traditional theory (although for diﬀerent reasons), the role of CUs in world trade may be
much more significant than is currently believed.
A third contribution of this paper relates to the literature’s recent focus on endogenous
TA formation.10 A key goal of this strand of the TAs literature is to predict, given country
9See, for example, Richardson (1994) and Facchini, Silva and Willmann (2012).
10The seminal contribution to this literature is due to Riezman (1985).
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characteristics, what types of TAs (if any) will form. Existing work in this vein assumes that
CU members (by definition) levy a CET; that is, only SCUs can form. Our paper argues
that there is an alternative type of CU - a GCU - that countries may (and, indeed, often
will) choose to establish. In contrast to the existing literature, therefore, this paper makes
the decision of CU members to levy a CET (not just the rate chosen) endogenous.
Consideration of an additional type of TA in models of endogenous coalition formation
also has the potential to significantly influence the nature of the equilibrium coalition struc-
ture; for example, the contents of the core. In this case, in particular, the introduction of
GCUs as an additional type of TA has the potential to be especially disruptive to coalition
formation. This is because GCUs are likely to be used as a direct substitute for FTAs - a
fact that may not be readily apparent in practice due to the superficial similarity between
these two TA types.
A fourth contribution of the paper relates to the WTO’s role in regulating TA formation.
In the literature, the rules as set out in Article XXIV are invariably taken to be exogenous
and are rarely, if ever, justified. In what follows we demonstrate that the WTO’s CET
constraint may be motivated by a desire to curtail the monopoly power of CU members.
However, we also show that prospective members may not feel compelled to levy a CET.
They will only do so if they believe that disregardingArticle XXIV will lead to legal sanction.
This last point emphasizes the folly of assuming that a CET is a non-negotiable characteristic
of all CUs.
This paper also sounds a cautionary note on empirical testing of TAs. Recently, there
have been attempts to measure the diﬀerent impact that FTAs and CUs have on the trading
environment.11 In light of our analysis, there is a significant risk that in such empirical work
TAs are incorrectly classified as FTAs rather than (G)CUs. As a result, any trade and policy
eﬀects resulting from a camouflaged GCU may be wrongly attributed to FTAs.
A final contribution of the paper is that it identifies a dual role for FTAs in TA formation.
Not only do FTAs provide countries with an additional option for coalition formation, they
can also, if required, act as a convenient “fig leaf” that can be used to hide the true intentions
of CU members in external tariﬀ choice.
11See, for example, Estevadeordal et al. (2008), Magee (2008) and Roy (2010).
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2 The Model
Consider a world of three countries in which TAs can form. Assume that one country,
Country 3 here, is “passive” in the sense that it does not sign TAs. Countries 1 and 2, on
the other hand, are “active”; they may negotiate a bilateral TA if they wish. Further, assume
that countries 1 and 2 can choose between three alternative types of bilateral trade blocs - a
FTA, a SCU, or a GCU.12 Define the set of three possible TA types as  = (  )13
Consistent with WTO rules, all TA types comply with the most-favored nation (MFN)
principle in the sense that the external tariﬀ rate levied by an individual member must be
applied equally to all non-members.
The three countries engage in a multi-stage trade policy game. In stage one, countries 1
and 2 choose a TA,  ∈  and associated lump sum transfers,    = 1 2. In stage two,
given the TA that has formed, all three countries choose their tariﬀs,    = 13 where
 denotes the tariﬀ that Country  pays Country  and where  = 0 In stage three, given
the previously chosen TA and tariﬀs, the firms in the three countries choose their outputs
in each market. These outputs are denoted by  the quantity that firm  sells in Country
 For simplicity, we assume that there is one firm domiciled in each country.14 Country 0s
firm is referred to as firm  Finally, we assume that all elements of the game are common
knowledge.15 But, though observable, member TA welfare rankings are not verifiable by the
WTO. Moreover, while the WTO can verify whether or not members are levying a CET, it
cannot verify that the observed tariﬀ rates themselves correspond to the observed TAs.
12It can be shown that the total welfare of countries 1 and 2 is lower when they stand alone than under
any TA. For simplicity, therefore, we do not explcitly refer to the stand alone case in the following discussion.
13The assumption that Country 3 is passive means that we do not have to consider the case of global free
trade. This simplifies the analysis significantly as, otherwise, we would have to consider all possible coalition
structures among the three countries, not just those involving countries 1 and 2. It turns out, however, that
in this model, global free trade dominates all other TA types. Therefore, by abstracting from global free
trade we implicitly assume that the grand coalition cannot form for some reason exogenous to our modeling
framework.
14Assuming multiple firms yields little additional insight for our purposes while making the analysis more
cumbersome.
15Introducing any asymmetric or incomplete information (over parameters and social welfare functions,
for example) will make it easier for members to camouflage their coalition formation intentions and, hence,
will strengthen our results.
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Country 0 demand function is given by:16
 = (; )  = 13
where  =
3X
=1
 is the aggregate output sold in Country  (; )  0 and
  0 is a demand shift parameter with (; )  0We assume that the markets are
segmented, so consumers in the three countries may face diﬀerent prices. The technology of
the firms in the three countries is captured by their marginal (and average) costs   = 13
2.1 Stage 3: Output Choice
In stage 3, the three firms choose their outputs simultaneously in a Cournot game given the
chosen tariﬀs and the TA. Given the demand functions defined in the section above and the
tariﬀ rates chosen by each country, the profit firm  makes from selling in Country  is given
by:
 = [(; )−  − ] ≡ ( ;  )   = 13 (1)
where  = (1 2 3) is the vector of quantities sold in Country 
Since markets are segmented, the Nash equilibrium quantities in Country  are obtained
by the simultaneous solution to the three countries’ profit maximization problems given by:
max
( ;  )  = 13 (2)
We assume that the ( ;  ) functions are strictly concave in  (thus giving rise
to continuous best reply functions). Let the Nash Equilibrium quantities in Country  be
denoted by the vector ∗ = ∗(;  ) where  = (1 2 3) is the vector of tariﬀs levied
by Country  and  = (12 3) Note that while ∗ depends on the vectors  and , it only
depends on Country ’s demand parameter  (and not 6=) Let the corresponding Nash
16It is also possible to introduce further demand diﬀerences by taking the demand functions themselves to
be diﬀerent, i.e.,  6=  for all  but we do not pursue this here.
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equilibrium profits, be denoted as:
∗[;  ] ≡ [∗(;  ) ;  ]  = 13 (3)
Whereas (not surprisingly) ∗[;  ] is decreasing in  and  it is increasing in 6= and
6=
2.2 Stage 2: Tariﬀ Choice
In stage 2, the countries choose their tariﬀs given the TA in stage 1. We define the net
welfare of Country  (welfare minus lump sum transfers) as the sum of consumer surplus,
producer surplus and tariﬀ revenue. Using the Nash equilibrium quantities derived above,
we can explicitly write Country 0 (net) welfare in stage 3 as:
(;  ) ≡
∗Z
0
[(; )−(∗ ; )]+
3X
=1
∗[;  ] +
X
 6=
∗(;  ) (4)
where  ≡ (1 2 3) is the vector of all tariﬀs,  is the vector of all the  terms and
∗ =
3X
=1
∗
2.2.1 Tariﬀ Choice: Free Trade Area
In order to be able to examine the choice of tariﬀs, we must consider the tariﬀ restrictions
implied by the diﬀerent possible TAs. If countries 1 and 2 form a FTA in the first stage,
then 12 = 21 = 0 Moreover, the MFN rule requires that 13 = 23 (and, of course,  = 0)
Given these restrictions, we can define the feasible set of tariﬀs facing countries 1 and 2,
when they form a FTA, as     = 1 2 namely,
 1 ≡ {1 : 21 = 0 11 = 0} (5)
 2 ≡ {2 : 12 = 0 22 = 0} (6)
With  each FTA member, therefore, chooses only one tariﬀ.
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Since Country 3 does not sign a TA, it’s restrictions are the same for any  ∈  chosen
by countries 1 and 2: they are simply given by the MFN rules. Thus, if we define the feasible
set of tariﬀs facing Country 3, when countries 1 and 2 have an agreement  ∈  as  3  then
we have:
 3 ≡ 3 ≡ {3 : 13 = 23 33 = 0} for all  ∈  (7)
Hence, Country 3 also chooses only one tariﬀ.
Given the tariﬀ restrictions facing all countries (all the restrictions listed in equations (5)
- (7)), the overall feasible set of (all) tariﬀs is given by (the intersection of the feasible sets
in equations (5) - (7)):
  ≡  1 ∩  2 ∩ 3
In other words, it is given by,
  ≡ {(1 2 3) : 12 = 21 = 0 13 = 23 11 = 22 = 33 = 0}
Each country will maximize its welfare given the combined set of restrictions that follow from
the agreement  ∈  The three countries’ net welfare maximization problems are, therefore,
given by:
max

{(1 2 3; ) :  ∈  }  = 13
where  ≡ ( ) is the vector of all demand and cost parameters.
Alternatively, we can satisfy the restrictions in (5) - (7) by substituting them directly
into each country’s welfare function. First, define the single tariﬀ that is chosen by each of
the three countries when countries 1 and 2 form a FTA in the first stage as:
1 ≡ 31 2 ≡ 32 3 ≡ 13 = 23 (8)
Implicit in our definition of a FTA is the assumption that the rules of origin required to
support the diﬀerent external tariﬀ rates levied by countries 1 and 2 on the excluded Country
3 are completely eﬀectively enforced and that, consequently, there is no trade deflection
between the FTA members.
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Using these definitions and substituting the restrictions directly into the countries’ welfare
functions, we get:
 ≡  (1  2  3 ; ) ≡ {(1 2 3; ) :  ∈   definitions (8)}  = 13 (9)
In other words, the  functions are the original  functions, but with all the constraints
(and definitions (8)) imposed; they are functions of three tariﬀs, rather than all the tariﬀs.
The three countries’ net welfare maximization problems can now be written as:
max

{ (1  2  3 ; )}  = 13
We assume that, for each country  = 13, the net welfare function,  , is strictly concave
in its own tariﬀ,  (consequently, all best reply functions are continuous).
The following very useful property of the net welfare functions can now be obtained:
Proposition 1 Each country’s net welfare function, (1  2  3 ; ) is additively sepa-
rable in all tariﬀs.
Proof. This follows directly from the following: (i) market segmentation implies that the
three Nash Equilibrium quantities in Country  depend only on the tariﬀ levied by Country
 ( ) (ii) this, in turn, implies that Country ’s profits from selling in each market depend
only on tariﬀs in that market (iii) consumer surplus in Country  (which depends on total
output sold in Country ) depends on the tariﬀ levied by Country  (iv) by definition, the
welfare of Country  is additive in its components; the sum of consumer surplus, profits and
tariﬀ revenues.
As a result of this separability we have the following special property of the best reply
functions:
Proposition 2 The tariﬀs 1  2  3 are strategically neutral: we can solve for each 
separately.
Proof. Separability in tariﬀs implies that: 2 (; )  6= = 0 so tariﬀs are
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strategically neutral and we can solve for each  separately.17
The explicit expressions for  (; ) can be easily calculated, for example, for the
linear demand functions,  =  −  = 13 (where   0), used in Sections 3.2 and 3.3
below18
Let the Nash equilibrium tariﬀ in Country  be denoted as ∗ ()  = 1319 The
corresponding Nash equilibrium net welfare in each country is then given by:
∗ () ≡ (∗(); )  = 13 (10)
where ∗() = [∗1 () ∗2 () ∗3 ()] is the vector of equilibrium tariﬀs.20
2.2.2 Tariﬀ Choice: Standard and Generalized Customs Unions
If countries 1 and 2 form a SCU in the first stage, in addition to free trade between them
(12 = 21 = 0) they also levy a CET on Country 3 (31 = 32) Letting  12 be the feasible
set of tariﬀs facing countries 1 and 2 when they form a SCU, we have:
 12 ≡ {(1 2) : 12 = 21 = 0 31 = 32 11 = 22 = 0} (11)
Since Country 3 does not sign a TA, its restrictions are the same as they were in the 
case (that is, 13 = 23 33 = 0) so its feasible set of tariﬀs is still given by 3 ≡ {3 : 13 =
23 33 = 0} With , therefore, the SCU members choose only one tariﬀ and similarly,
Country 3 also chooses only one tariﬀ.
Given the tariﬀ restrictions facing Country 3 and the SCU countries, the overall feasible
17Note that the same applies to all TAs, including both types of CU.
18These expressions can be provided upon request.
19For example, in the linear demand case mentioned above the Nash Equilibrium tariﬀs are given by:
∗ ( ) = 17 − 121 + 13 − 373   = 1 2  6=  and ∗3 ( ) = 110(33 −
3X
=1
)
20The Nash equilibrium welfare, for Country  can be calculated for the linear demand example
as the following quadratic function (in the demand and cost parameters): ∗ =
3X
=1
3X
=1
 
+
3X
=1
3X
=1
 +
3X
=1
2  where the values of the parameters   and  can be provided upon
request.
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set of (all) tariﬀs is given by (the intersection of the two feasible sets (7), (11)):
  ≡  12 ∩ 3
In other words, it is given by,
  ≡ {(1 2 3) : 12 = 21 = 0 31 = 32 11 = 22 = 33 = 0 13 = 23} (12)
If countries 1 and 2 form a GCU in the first stage, they do not necessarily levy a common
external tariﬀ on Country 3. In other words, now we may have 31 6= 32 Letting  12 be
the feasible set of tariﬀs facing countries 1 and 2 when they form a GCU, we have:
 12 ≡ {(1 2) : 12 = 21 = 0 11 = 22 = 0} (13)
As in the  case above, the feasible set of tariﬀs facing Country 3 is still given by
3 Hence, with  the members choose two tariﬀs, but Country 3 still chooses only one
tariﬀ. Thus, while GCU members have more trade policy degrees of freedom relative to SCU
members, they have the same trade policy degrees of freedom as in the  case.
Given the tariﬀ restrictions facing Country 3 and the GCU countries, the overall feasible
set of (all) tariﬀs is given by (the intersection of the two feasible sets (7), (13)):
  ≡  12 ∩ 3
In other words, it is given by,
  ≡ {(1 2 3) : 12 = 21 = 0 11 = 22 = 33 = 0 13 = 23} (14)
Notice that:
  ⊂  
  ≡  
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In other words, while   is the “smallest” set,   and   are identical. As will be shown
later, this can explain why a GCU can be camouflaged as a FTA.
We assume that in both the  and  cases countries 1 and 2 jointly choose their
optimal tariﬀs by maximizing (a social welfare function which is simply) the sum of their
welfare:21
(1 2 3; ) ≡ {1(1 2 3; ) + 2(1 2 3; )} (15)
As is clear, the joint welfare maximization internalizes all existing externalities. Country 3,
on the other hand, maximizes its welfare function as before. Thus, the countries’ problems
in case  =   can be written as:
max
12
{(1 2 3; ) : (1 2) ∈  }  =   (16)
max
3
{3(1 2 3; ) : 3 ∈  }  =  
Alternatively, as we did in the  case, we can satisfy the restrictions in (7), (12) and
(14) by substituting them directly into the objective functions. To do this, define the tariﬀs
to be chosen by the SCU and Country 3, in the  case as:
 ≡ 31 = 32 3 ≡ 13 = 23 (17)
Similarly, define the vector of tariﬀs to be chosen by the GCU and Country 3’s tariﬀ in the
 case as:
 = (1  2 ) ≡ (31 32) 3 ≡ 13 = 23 (18)
Once again, as in the  case, we implicitly assume that GCU rules of origin are completely
eﬀectively enforced and that, consequently, there is no trade deflection between the GCU
members.
Then, using these definitions and substituting the restrictions directly into the objective
21Since 1 +2 = 0 it follows that the sum of the two countries’ welfare is the same as the sum of
their net welfare. Maximizing a weighted sum of welfare yields similar results.
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functions, we get in the  case:
( 3 ; ) ≡ {(1 2 3; ) : (1 2) ∈   definitions (17)} (19)
3 ( 3 ; ) ≡ {3(1 2 3; ) : 3 ∈   definitions (17)}
and in the  case:
( 3 ; ) ≡ ( 3 ; ) ≡ {(1 2 3; ) : (1 2) ∈   definitions (18)}(20)
3 ( 3 ; ) ≡ {3(1 2 3; ) : 3 ∈   definitions (18)}
Again, the welfare functions in equations, (19) and (20) are the original welfare functions,
but with all the constraints (and definitions (17) and (18), respectively) imposed: rather than
being a function of all tariﬀs,  and 3 are functions of two tariﬀs, whereas  and
3 are functions of three tariﬀs (remember that  = (1  2 )). Note however, that
since   ≡   (all the restrictions are the same) we have the same welfare functions in
the  and  cases.22
The problems in (16) can, therefore, be written as:
max {
( 3; )} and max3 {

3( 3; )}  =  
We assume that objective functions  and 3   =   are strictly concave in  3
respectively (resulting in continuous best reply functions).
Once again, as in the  case above it can be easily shown that:
Proposition 3 For  =   : (i) ( 3; ) and 3( 3; ) are additively separable
in tariﬀs, (ii) the tariﬀs  3 are strategically neutral: we can solve for each  3 separately.
Proof. Same as in Propositions 1 and 2.
Let the Nash equilibrium tariﬀs for  =   be denoted as {∗() ∗3 ()}23 The
22That is, if we hold tariﬀs to be the same in both cases (taken as 1 2 3) then: 1 (1 2 3; ) +
2 (1 2 3; ) = 1 (1 2 3; ) +2 (1 2 3; ). See Appendix 5.2.
23The explicit expressions for these equlibrium tariﬀs in the linear case are: ∗( ) = 119(21+91−4)+

19(1−161+7) ∗31 ( ) = 21+21+51−31+5−2232−2  ∗32 ( ) = 2−71+131−62232−2  ∗3 ( ) = 110(23−1)
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corresponding Nash equilibrium welfare in each country and in the CU are therefore, respec-
tively, given by:24
∗ ( ) ≡  [∗() ∗3 (); ]  = 1 2
∗3( ) ≡ 3 [∗() ∗3 (); ]
∗( ) ≡ 1 [∗() ∗3 (); ] + 2 [∗() ∗3 (); ]
2.3 Stage 1: The Choice of TA
To examine the choice of TAs, let us extend the definition of total Country 1 and 2 welfare
to the  case. Thus, we write the total welfare of countries 1 and 2, for any TA,  ∈  ≡
{  } as:
∗[; ] ≡ {∗1( ) +1}+ {∗2( ) +2} = ∗1( ) + ∗2( )
The countries select a TA by comparing the total welfare corresponding to the three elements
of  Specifically, let ∗ be the chosen (equilibrium) agreement, Then,
Proposition 4 The agreement ∗ is chosen if and only if for all  ∈  : ∗(∗; ) 
∗(; ) for all  6= ∗
Proof. (i) If  (∗; )   (; ) for all  6= ∗ there must be corresponding transfers,
given by ∗  where ∗1 + ∗2 = 0 such that ∗ (∗; ) + ∗  ∗ ( ; ) thus ∗
is preferred to any another agreement.25 (ii) If ∗ is chosen, it must be better than any
other agreement for both countries. In other words, we must have: ∗1(∗; ) + ∗1 
∗1(; ) and ∗2(∗; ) + ∗2  ∗2(; ) for all  6= ∗ where ∗1 + ∗2 = 0 Hence,
 [∗; ] = ∗1(∗; ) + ∗2(∗; ) = ∗1(∗; ) +∗1 + ∗2(∗; ) +∗2  ∗1(; ) + ∗2(; )
= [; ] for all  6= ∗26
24The Nash equilibrium welfare for can now be easily calculated for the case of linear demands. It is given
by a quadratic equation that is similar to the one in the  case, with the superscript changed to  and
 instead of  This is available upon request.
25But, on the other hand, there are no transfers,   where 1 + 2 = 0 such that ∗ (; ) +  ∗ (∗; )
26It is useful to note that while the choice of agreement is always unique, the transfers are not uniquely
determined. Since our objective is to identify the optimal TA this is not a major problem here.
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3 Results
In this section we use the model introduced in Section 2 to show that: (i) the optimal CU for
member countries is, in fact, a GCU, (ii) camouflaged CUs are likely to arise when member
country demands are asymmetric and (iii) the WTO should encourage the creation of FTAs
and SCUs since they produce the best (world) welfare outcomes.
3.1 The Welfare Dominance of a GCU
The following propositions show that, from the point of view of prospective member coun-
tries, a GCU dominates both a SCU and a FTA.
Proposition 5  Â  for all  and  but  v  iﬀ the countries are symmetric.
Proof. See Appendix 5.1.
Proposition 6  Â  for all  and 
Proof. See Appendix 5.2.
Intuitively, Proposition 5 is based on the fact that members of a GCU face a larger
feasible tariﬀ set (  ∈  ), so they can choose identical tariﬀs - and, hence, a SCU
- if they wish. In fact, this is never the case; members strictly prefer a GCU to a SCU
except when they are symmetric, in which case they are indiﬀerent between the two. While
this intuition is correct for single-decision-maker problems it is, in general, a little simplistic
in the context of strategic games, as is the case here. Specifically, in Proposition 5, we
compare the Nash equilibrium welfare outcomes of diﬀerent TAs (strategic games) in which
the non-member country can respond optimally to the external tariﬀ choices of members.
Nevertheless, the simple intuition is, in fact, correct in our strategic games framework,
because (as demonstrated in Section 2) Country 3’s optimal tariﬀs are independent of the
TA choice made by countries 1 and 2.
Regarding Proposition 6, a GCU strictly welfare dominates a FTA because, apart from
the internalization of the tariﬀ externality implicit in joint welfare maximization by GCU
members, a GCU and a FTA are otherwise identical (  =  ).27
27Note that the same is not true for the comparison between a SCU and a FTA. In this case, when a CET
is chosen, the internalization benefits of joint welfare maximization are oﬀset by the costs associated with
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3.2 When will GCUs be Observed?
Unfortunately, while it was suﬃcient to demonstrate the welfare dominance of a GCU over
both a SCU and a FTA, the general modeling framework introduced in Section 2 does not
permit us to derive a complete welfare ranking among all TA types. In particular, we need
to add structure to our general model in order to obtain a welfare ranking of  and .
As we demonstrate below, the ranking of  vis-à-vis  can be crucial for determining
whether or not prospective members will choose to implement a GCU or a SCU.
In what follows, we simply assume linear demand; that is, (; ) = −  = 13
where   0 is a demand parameter and =
3X
=1
 is the aggregate output sold in Country
 The following proposition identifies the conditions under which we can expect to observe
a GCU as opposed to a SCU.
Proposition 7 Consider a world in which consumer demand is linear and  =  ∀. In
this case, the ranking of TAs by prospective members is either: (i)  Â  Â  if
12−(1+2)+2
(1−2)2  7131024 or (ii)  Â  Â  if 12−(1+2)+
2
(1−2)2  7131024 for all , 
Proof. See Appendix 5.3.
Proposition 7 confirms that, indeed, for our linear demand curve example (and for all
values of the demand and cost parameters), a GCU welfare-dominates all other TA types28.
Moreover, as demonstrated in Proposition 7(i), the more asymmetric are prospective member
country demands the more likely it is that prospective members will prefer to form a FTA
rather than a SCU. In this case, members may be able to get away with implementing a
GCU in defiance of Article XXIV if, for example, their preference for a FTA (among WTO-
compliant TA types) is observable and the absence of a CET is verifiable, but the distinction
between GCU and FTA tariﬀs is not verifiable. If, together, these (consistent) observations
are suﬃcient to satisfy the legal burden of proof in a court of law, we have the case of
camouflaged CUs.
the “distance” the CET lies from either member’s preferred unilateral external tariﬀ rate. For this reason,
the welfare ranking of  versus  is ambiguous as demonstrated in the next section.
28Remember that standing alone is always the worst option and so, for simplicity, has been excluded from
the analysis.
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On the other hand, Proposition 7(ii) implies that if the demands of countries 1 and
2 are suﬃciently similar, they will prefer to form a SCU rather than a FTA. In this case,
prospective members may (depending on the required legal burden of proof) decide to respect
Article XXIV and levy a CET even though a GCU is still their preferred TA type. To see
this, consider the situation in which their preference for a SCU (among WTO-compliant TA
types) is observable, the absence of the CET is verifiable and members decide not to levy
a CET. The WTO (and excluded countries) would immediately infer that a GCU has been
implemented. To the extent that the observed inconsistency between their preference for a
SCU (among WTO-compliant TA types) and the verifiable absence of a CET is suﬃcient
proof in court, then legal sanction will be imposed. Thus, in this case, members cannot get
away with implementing a GCU in defiance of Article XXIV and consequently, a SCU will
be chosen.
These two cases are shown in Figure 1. For the purpose of this exercise, assume that
 = 12 ∀. Figure 1 identifies the regions in demand-parameter space in which a SCU or a
GCU will be observed, under the conditions discussed above. The regions at the extremities
of Figure 1 (high 1, low 2 and vice versa), in which  is preferred to , correspond to
the case of camouflaged CUs; that is, a GCU with a more-than-passing resemblance (in law)
to a FTA may be implemented in spite of Article XXIV. In the central regions of Figure 1 (in
the vicinity of the diagonal),  is preferred to ; Article XXIV can potentially be used
to ensure that a SCU is established. Along the diagonal, countries 1 and 2 are identical; the
GCU and SCU equilibria coincide.
Propositions 6 - 7 and Figure 1 highlight one weakness of the modeling framework adopted
in this paper; namely, FTAs are never the most preferred type of TA. If we were to interpret
these results literally, therefore, we would conclude that all FTAs observed in reality are
GCUs - an outcome which we consider to be highly unlikely in practice. A more reasonable
interpretation of our results is that there exist factors exogenous to our model (uncertainty,
political considerations, or transactions costs, for example) that may make a FTA preferable
to a GCU from the point of view of prospective member countries.
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Figure 1: Member country preferences over trade agreement types when  = 1
2
.
3.3 Why Does the WTO Require CU Members to Levy a CET?
The following proposition shows how the equilibrium external tariﬀs levied by countries 1
and 2 vary with the type of TA they form.
Proposition 8 Consider a world in which consumer demand is linear and  =  ∀.
Without loss of generality, also assume that 1  2. In this case, the ranking of equilibrium
external tariﬀs levied by prospective TA members is: 1  1    2  2 29
Proof. See Appendix 5.4.
Proposition 8 shows that, for each type of TA (excluding SCU, of course), the larger
of the two prospective member countries (Country 1 here) sets a higher external tariﬀ rate
than the smaller country (Country 2). Moreover, in terms of the magnitude of external tariﬀ
rates levied by prospective members, the CET ranks exactly in the middle. In other words,
29Taking into account the case when countries stand alone (), the ranking becomes: 1  1  1 
  2  2  2 
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for any TA type other than SCU, the external tariﬀs levied by the large and small member
nest the CET associated with the SCU.
Proposition 8 also reveals that the relatively large prospective member chooses the highest
external tariﬀ rate when it is a member of a GCU and the lowest external tariﬀ rate (the
CET, in fact) when it is a member of a SCU. On the other hand, the relatively small
prospective member chooses its highest external tariﬀ rate under SCU (when it chooses
the CET jointly with its larger partner) and the lowest external tariﬀ rate under a FTA.
Proposition 8, therefore, suggests that by insisting that CU members levy a CET, the WTO
restrains the monopoly power of the larger member while permitting that of the smaller
member to increase.
Given that Article XXIV states that TAs are “not to raise barriers to the trade of other
contracting parties,” it would make sense that the WTO would seek to encourage those
TA types that yield the lowest external tariﬀ rates. Unfortunately, Proposition 8 does not
provide much insight into this issue since members’ individual external tariﬀ rates under
GCU and FTA nest the CET. However, an alternative interpretation of Article XXIV may
be that the WTO seeks to encourage TAs that minimize the trade-weighted external tariﬀs
of prospective member countries. To show this, denote the trade-weighted external tariﬀs as
   = (  ) 30 Then, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 9 Consider a world in which consumer demand is linear and  =  ∀ With-
out loss of generality, also assume that 1  2. Provided that 1 2 are suﬃciently similar,
the ranking of the trade-weighted equilibrium external tariﬀs levied by prospective TA mem-
bers is:    =     If 1 2 are suﬃciently diﬀerent, the ranking becomes:
     = 31
Proof. See Appendix 5.5.
Proposition 9 shows that a GCU results in external tariﬀ rates that are higher in trade-
weighted terms than those levied by either a SCU or a FTA. This provides some circumstan-
tial evidence to justify the structure of Article XXIV. In particular, in the absence of global
30See Appendix 5.6 for the precise definition.
31The trade-weighted equilibrium external tariﬀs levied by countries 1 and 2 are highest when they choose
to stand alone. This is true for all 1 2.
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free trade, the WTO should encourage the creation of FTAs or SCUs since one of these TA
types will result in the lowest tariﬀ rates being levied on non-members.32
Trade-weighted external tariﬀs provide some evidence as to the welfare impact of diﬀerent
types of TAs on non-member countries. But, of course, the WTO is interested in the welfare
of all countries, not just that of non-members. In order to get a more complete picture of the
overall welfare impact of TAs we measure the total world welfare that results in equilibrium
under each TA type. This is the subject of the next proposition.
Proposition 10 Consider a world in which consumer demand is linear and  =  ∀
Without loss of generality, also assume that 1  2. Provided that 1 2 are suﬃciently
similar, ranking TA types according to the total world welfare they imply in equilibrium yields:
 Â  Â  If 1 2 are suﬃciently diﬀerent, the ranking becomes:  Â  Â 33
Proof. See Appendix 5.6.
Proposition 10 bolsters the results obtained in Proposition 9. If the WTO wishes to
maximize world welfare, it should discourage standing alone while encouraging the formation
of SCUs and FTAs since the latter yield the highest world welfare. At the same time, the
CET constraint ensures a higher world welfare outcome than is achieved by a GCU. The
diﬃculty for the WTO, of course, arises from the fact that it may have no practical way of
diﬀerentiating in a legally verifiable way between a FTA and a GCU. Conditional on a CU
being formed, the CET constraint leads to a superior outcome in terms of world welfare.
The irony is that the mere ability to form a FTA (which can maximize world welfare in the
absence of global free trade) undermines the welfare-enhancing role of the CET. Countries
can form a GCU which, by its nature, is camouflaged to look like a FTA.
Finally, Propositions 9 and 10 also provide a possible clue for why the WTO does not try
to explicitly proscribe GCUs. Since GCUs and FTAs are, for all practical purposes, likely to
be indistinguishable from one another, the WTO must either prohibit both or neither. But,
32The WTO should, at all costs, discourage countries from standing alone since we can easily show that
this is when external tariﬀs are highest (even higher than under a GCU). This observation provides a possible
justification for the presence of Article XXIV in the first place, despite the fact that it represents a stark
departure from the MFN principle which forms one of the foundations of the GATT. Any discriminatory
TA, even a GCU, is preferable to standing alone.
33Standing alone yields the lowest world welfare for all 1 2.
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as Propositions 9 and 10 demonstrate, prohibiting FTAs is undesirable given the relatively
low external tariﬀs and relatively high world welfare they entail. In addition, from the point
of view of minimizing the external tariﬀ burden on non-members, a GCU is better than
“nothing” (that is, standing alone).
4 Conclusion
We have argued in this paper that many of the FTAs observed in practice may, in fact, be
CUs in disguise. This has been achieved by introducing the notion of a GCU - characterized
by diﬀerent external tariﬀ rates - that contrasts with the standard definition of a CU -
characterized by a CET - that, until now, has dominated the literature as well as practical
policy making. The main insight is that, in practice, it may not be possible to distinguish
between a GCU and a FTA in a legally verifiable way.
We demonstrated that, given the choice, prospective members will always prefer a GCU
to either a SCU or a FTA. However, in practice, situations may arise in which members are
restricted from implementing a GCU by Article XXIV of the GATT which requires that
CU members harmonize their trade policy vis-à-vis excluded countries. This may occur, for
example, if prospective members prefer a SCU to a FTA. If, additionally, this ranking is
observable, the absence of a CET is verifiable and together these observations are suﬃcient
to satisfy the legal burden of proof in a court of law, then a SCU will form. Alternatively,
if prospective members prefer a FTA to a SCU, a GCU may be implemented in defiance of
Article XXIV if there is no legally verifiable way to distinguish between a GCU and a FTA.
Having demonstrated that GCUs can, in fact, be observed, our next task was to rational-
ize the contents of Article XXIV of the GATT. We showed that, by obliging CU members to
levy a CET, the WTO reduces their monopoly power (relative to a GCU) in trade-weighted
terms. However much it would like to, the WTO cannot explicitly proscribe GCUs in prac-
tice because of their close resemblance to FTAs. Consequently, the WTO would have to
either prohibit both GCUs and FTAs or neither; the latter approach is preferable given the
world welfare benefits associated with FTAs that we have demonstrated here.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 5:
Part (i): By definition (suppressing the parameters):
(∗ 3) ≡ max12{(1 2 3) : (1 2) ∈  } ≥ (1 2 3)   (1 2) ∈  
and any 3
(∗ 3) ≡ max12{(1 2 3) : (1 2) ∈  } ≥ (1 2 3)   (1 2) ∈  
and any 3But, since   ∈  ,max12{(1 2 3) : (1 2) ∈  } ≥ max12{(1 2 3) :
(1 2) ∈  } for all 3
However, given the separability of the objective functions, we know that the solution
for  and 3 do not depend on each other. Specifically, the solution for 3 does not de-
pend on ∗ for  =   Hence, the solution for ∗3 must be the same for SCU and
GCU: ∗3 = ∗3 = ∗3. Thus, in the above inequality we must have: (∗ ∗3) ≡
max12{(1 2 ∗3) : (1 2) ∈  } ≥ max12{(1 2 ∗3) : (1 2) ∈  }
≡ (∗ ∗3) That is:  Â  for all  and 
Part (ii): If the countries are symmetric we have: 1 = 2 1 = 2 With perfectly
symmetric countries the solution must be symmetric (the standard property of all bargaining
problems). Thus we must have a common tariﬀ levied on Country 3. The solutions, therefore,
become the same as in the SCU case: ∗31 = ∗32 = ∗
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5.2 Proof of Proposition 6:
By definition: (∗31  ∗32  3) = 1 (∗31  ∗32  3)+2 (∗31  ∗32  3) ≡max12{1(1 2 3)+
2(1 2 3) : (1 2) ∈  } ≥ 1(1 2 3) + 2(1 2 3)   (1 2) ∈   and any
3 But, since   ≡   we have (∗1  ∗2 ) ∈   ≡  . Hence, 1 (∗31  ∗32  3) +
2 (∗31  ∗32  3) ≥ 1 (∗1  ∗2  3) + 2 (∗1  ∗2  3) for all 3
But, again, since the solution for tariﬀs are obtained independently, 3 is the same for all
 =    we have: ∗3 = ∗3 = ∗3. Furthermore, the solutions for ∗31  ∗32 are
unaﬀected by ∗3
Now, note however, that since   ≡   (all the restrictions are the same) we have
the same welfare functions in the  and  cases. Namely, if we hold tariﬀs to be
the same in both cases (taken as 1 2 3) then: 3 (1 2 3; ) = 3 (1 2 3; ) and
(1 2 3; ) ≡ 1 (1 2 3; )+2 (1 2 3; ) = 1 (1 2 3; )+2 (1 2 3; ) ≡
(1 2 3; ). Thus, in the above inequality we must have:
(∗31  ∗32  ∗3 ) = 1 (∗31  ∗32  ∗3) +2 (∗31  ∗32  ∗3) ≥ 1 (∗1  ∗2  ∗3 )+
2 (∗1  ∗2  ∗3 ) = 1 (∗1  ∗2  ∗3 )+2 (∗1  ∗2  ∗3 ) ≡ (∗31  ∗32  ∗3 )
That is:  Â  for all , ¥
5.3 Proof of Proposition 7
Let ∗ () be the equilibrium welfare of country  when countries 1 and 2 decide to stand
alone. It is straightforward to show that (suppressing the parameters) for all ,  : ∗() ≥
∗(); ∗()  ∗(); ∗()  ∗(); ∗()  ∗(); ∗()  ∗() In
addition: ∗()  ∗() if 12−(1+2)+2
(1−2)2  7131024 ¥
5.4 Proof of Proposition 8
It is straightforward to show that when 1  2:   1    2  1  1  2  2 
1   2   1  1  2  2  1   2   1  1 and 2  2 
These inequalities taken together, yield the tariﬀ ranking in Proposition 8.¥
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5.5 Proof of Proposition 9
Define:  =
h 31
(31+32) ∗ 1
i
+
h
32
(31+32) ∗ 2
i
  =
h 31
(31+32) ∗ 1
i
+
h
32
(31+32) ∗ 2
i
and  =
h
31
(31+32) ∗ 1
i
+
h 32
(31+32) ∗ 2
i
 It is straightforward to show that when 1  2
we have:               and     Moreover,
   if 1 2 are suﬃciently similar. These inequalities taken together, yield the tariﬀ
ranking in Proposition 9.¥
5.6 Proof of Proposition 10
It is straightforward to show that when 1  2: (1 + 2 + 3 )  (1 + 2 + 3 ) ;
(1 + 2 + 3 )  (1 + 2 + 3 ) ; (1 + 2 + 3 ) 
³
1 + 2 + 3
´
;
(1 + 2 + 3 )  (1 + 2 + 3 ) and
³
1 + 2 + 3
´
 (1 + 2 + 3 ) 
Moreover, (1 + 2 + 3 ) 
³
1 + 2 + 3
´
if 1 2 are suﬃciently similar. These
inequalities taken together yield the welfare ranking in Proposition 10.¥
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